East Asian Capital Markets Integration - Steps Beyond ABMI by Andrew Sheng
EAST ASIAN CAPITAL MARKETS 
INTEGRATION: STEPS BEYOND ABMI
ANDREW SHENG
TUN ISMAIL ALI CHAIR IN MONETARY & FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
ADJUNCT PROFESSOR




FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
KTKWEK@UM.EDU.MY
EABER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PAPER NO. 11
EABER SECRETARIAT
CRAWFORD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT
ANU COLLEGE OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA © East Asian Bureau Of Economic Research  1
Advancing East Asian Economic Integration Conference  
22-23 February 2007, Bangkok 
 
East Asian Capital Markets Integration: Steps 






Tun Ismail Ali Chair in Monetary& Financial Economics 
Faculty of Economic and Administration 
University of Malaya 
 
Adjunct Professor 
Graduate School of Economic Management 
Tsinghua University  




Kwek Kian Teng 
Associate Professor 
Faculty of Economics and Administration 
University of Malaya 




1.    Introduction 
 
  July 2007 will mark the 10
th Anniversary of the Asian Financial Crisis.  Following 
the Crisis, the ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Manila in April 1999 decided to 
work towards strengthening ASEAN cooperation and also aims at wider (ASEAN+3) 
cooperation.  Since then, many measures, such as the Asian Bond Market Initiative 
(ABMI) and Chiangmai swap arrangements have been launched to considerable fanfare.  
There was common recognition that Asian economies need to cooperate more, build deep 
and liquid capital markets, improve surveillance, and strengthen risk management and 
supervision in order to avoid future financial crises.    
 
In an earlier paper,
2 it was suggested that despite considerable goodwill and 
intentions by the different Asian authorities, it has proved difficult to integrate Asian 
                                                 
1  The authors are grateful to many friends and colleagues for their helpful comments.  All opinions and 
views are personal to the authors. 
2 Andrew Sheng, “Building National and Regional Financial Markets: The East Asian Experience”, 
Emerging Markets Forum, Jakarta, September 2006 
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Bond Markets due to bureaucratic differences within countries and between countries.  
This paper tries to take the analysis further by using Network Theory and Douglass 
North’s new institutional framework to understand Asian capital markets can work 
together, through the “process” of searching for common values, common beliefs, 
common products and shared infrastructure.   
 
To begin with, conditions for regional integration has improved since the Asian 
economies have emerged beyond "original sin“ (Eichengreen and Hausman, 1999), i.e. 
that most countries cannot borrow internationally in their own currencies.   Asians have 
also understood the dangers of balance sheet weaknesses, particularly the “double 
mismatch” problem that plagued the Asian crisis economies.  Overall, Asian financial 
strength has improved since 1997/98, by reducing their foreign debt, strengthening their 
supervisory capacity, opened up their financial system more, and also built up 
considerable foreign exchange reserves.  The last serves to avoid the humiliation of 
getting once again into IMF conditionality.  
 
More, as foreign capital continued to pour into the Region arising from the 
improved economic conditions, particularly with the acceleration in growth of China and 
some recovery in Japan, new product innovation (such as Islamic finance), exchange 
traded funds, the rise of private equity and hedge funds and the demutualization of 
exchanges that have pushed for greater capital market integration.  As each Asian 
economy becomes more confident with higher domestic savings, there is awareness that 
the time has come to open up more to regionalism and globalization.   
 
Nevertheless, there are still many roadblocks in building a matured and vibrant 
regional capital market in East Asia
3.   The question is just the why, but how, what and 
for whom?  Although the Asian Development Bank has specifically articulated through 
excellent research and through the creation of an Office for Regional Integration that 
there are benefits in greater regional integration, there remains considerable questions to 
be answered on the following fronts: - 
 
•  What is the true Purpose of Capital Market Integration?  Who benefits? 
•  What are the Common Principles + Standards that the Region should use? 
•  Which are the Common Products and Why? 
•  Can we agree on Common Platforms? 
•  Can Incentives be built in such a way that winners can help the losers from 
integration? 
•  How do we reducing Transactions or Friction Costs + Risks during the 
Integration Process? 
•  How do we Share the Benefits of Integration more equitably? 




3 East Asia in this paper is defined as the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(henceforth ASEAN), the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China), Hong Kong SAR (henceforth 
Hong Kong), Japan and the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea). 
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These are not trivial questions and should be explored before we begin to rush 
into specific products or institutions.  This paper attempts a framework to think about 




2.    Trade Integration in East Asia
1 
 
A significant feature of East Asian integration is that trade integration has 
occurred in advance of financial integration.  East Asia has been able to world-class 
export sectors and industries, and emerged as the global manufacturing supply chain.   
Three indicators illuminate the importance of trade integration: -  
 
(i)     Largest increase in trade networking in the world as measured by trade 
connectivities – total trading partners for exports and imports; 
(ii)    Largest trade openness as measured by total trade per GDP 
(iii)   Larger Share of Total Trade/World Trade, compared with NAFTA (North-
South America, and Canada). 
 
 
  Table 1, which shows the trade connectivities from 1985–2005, demonstrates that 
East Asia is the only region that is expanding its trade networking (Figure 1).  Although 
the value of the trade connectivities of 0.7699 is the smallest value when compared 
NAFTA, and EU15 (referred to as the Euro zone or countries using the Euro dollar), their 
coefficient of trade networking has in fact declined.  
 
The degree of trade openness in East Asia has also strengthened trade integration 
(Table 2).  Indeed, not only is trade openness increasing, the importance of East Asia in 
total world trade relations has also grown significantly (Table 3).  East Asian’s share of 
world trade (25%) is already larger than NAFTA (16%), but this is smaller than the EU15 
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Table 1 
Trade Connectivities as Percentage of World Trading Partners 
 
  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
East Asia  0.4849  0.5488  0.6168  0.7546  0.7699 
ASEAN  0.3285  0.4023  0.4517  0.6769  0.6831 
Brunei   0.2117    0.2511  0.2885  0.3030 
Cambodia  0.0000    0.0000  0.3798  0.4711 
Indonesia  0.4089  0.5023  0.5230  0.8759  0.8489 
Malaysia  0.5272  0.7576  0.8178  0.7804  0.8614 
Philippines  0.4421  0.0000  0.6455  0.7057  0.7119 
Singapore  0.4670  0.5064  0.5874  0.8531  0.5957 
Thailand  0.5708  0.6476  0.7887  0.8634  0.8842 
Vietnam  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6683  0.7887 
           
Japan  0.7700  0.7742  0.8676  0.8800  0.8863 
China ML  0.6247    0.7721  0.8095  0.8510 
China HK  0.6164    0.6974  0.7534  0.7970 
Rep. 
Korea  0.5542  0.6164  0.7908  0.8863  0.8925 
  0.6413  0.6953  0.7820  0.8323  0.8567 
US   0.6912  0.8032  0.8863  0.9008  0.9091 
UK  0.7188  0.7342  0.8212  0.8289  0.8598 
EU  0.6552  0.6746  0.7572  0.7721  0.7941 
NAFTA  0.6088  0.7127  0.7874  0.8119  0.8690 
Source:  CONTRADE Database 
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Table 2    Trade Openness in East Asia (1985 – 2005) 
 
  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
East Asia  0.8836  0.8613  1.0882  1.1229  1.3395 
ASEAN  1.0688  1.3698  1.2791  1.3204  1.4554 
US  0.1351  0.1569  0.1830  0.2076  0.2117 
UK  0.4623  0.4116  0.4336  0.4309  0.3820 
EU15  0.5686  0.5005  0.5346  0.6920  0.6338 
NAFTA  0.2710  0.2613  0.4367  0.5022  0.4566 
Source:  CONTRADE Database 
 
 
Table 3    Regions’ Trade as a Percentage (%) of World Trade  
 
  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
East Asia  18.17  20.10  25.60  24.51  25.19 
ASEAN10  3.54  4.41  6.57  6.23  5.88 
US  15.22  13.48  13.57  15.76  12.59 
NAFTA  22.04  19.49  20.66  19.78  15.89 
UK  5.62  6.06  5.08  4.75  4.08 
EU15  38.81  45.34  43.67  34.82  62.77 
EU25  38.83  45.36  43.70  34.86  62.83 
Source:  CONTRADE Database 
 
 
3.    East Asia Financial and Capital Markets  
 
East Asia Financial and Capital Markets have three interesting features.  Firstly, 
the success in East Asian exports and high savings rate has created a high level of net 
foreign asset position, which arose not only because of the current account surplus, but 
also considerable inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI).  This created two distinct phenomena:  
 
 (i)  High foreign exchange reserves, which Lane and Milesi-Ferritti, 2006 has pointed 
out that “Asia has become a net exporter of capital” creating the other side of the 
global imbalance; and  
 (ii) Savings have flowed back into Asia, through what Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber, 2003 calls the “Total Equity Return Swap” effect. 
 
Through their balance sheet analysis, Lane and Milesi-Ferritti (2006) has pointed 
out that East Asia is concurrently both an exporter of manufactures and capital (Figure 2).  
At the end of 2004, Asia had a net foreign asset position of 30% of GDP (US$2.7 
trillion), whereas Europe had a net liability of 9.3% of GDP (US$1.2 trillion), and 
NAFTA had a much larger net liability of 22.9% of GDP (US$3.1 trillion).   The global 
imbalance position appears to be widening rather than narrowing. 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Dataset, February 2006 
 
 
The second feature of East Asian markets is the fact that its manufacturing 
prowess is not reflecting in the financial sector, which remains bank-dominated (Table 4).  
Despite strenuous efforts to develop the bond and equity markets, the Asian financial 
system remains bank-dominated, with still fledgling bond markets, speculative stock 
markets and relatively small insurance and pension and social security systems.   As the 
demographic profile of North Asia and the urban economies of Hong Kong SAR and 
Singapore become older, there is greater awareness that development of deep pension and 
retirement funds are a matter of high priority.    
 
The banking sectors in Asia (in terms of deposit base) account for 80–177% of 
GDP, which is large by emerging market standards.   The East Asian banking system has 
remained large, despite the fact that the Japanese banking system has withdrawn 
significantly from regional lending since the Asian crisis.  The Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS) cross border lending data showed that the Japanese bank lending to the 
Region fell by around US$250 billion from a peak exposure of US$375 billion in 1994 to 
only US$125 billion by 2001 (Jeanneau and Micu, 2002).   
 
Since the Asian crisis, the banking systems have improved their risk management 
but have concentrated on consumer lending rather than SME and corporate financing.  
The result is that the US and the European investment banks, hedge funds and private 





















Growing Imbalances: Net External Positions  7
particularly the innovative and therefore profitable part of the business.   Indeed, these 
financial intermediaries undertake the bulk of the cross-border financial activities, 
whereas national banks have remained essentially domestic based.  The Japanese and 
Korean banks have cut back their branches in Asia after the Asian crisis, whereas non-
Asian bank presence in East Asia has increased in size and scope.  Only in the last 3 years 
have some Malaysian and Chinese banks begun to invest in banks within the region.   
 
The third feature is the level of reforms that ASEAN-3 has undertaken especially 
in the last 5 years.  These reforms include: 
 
•  Promoting Financial Integration and Cooperation in East Asia Capital Markets; 
•  Bilateral foreign exchange swaps; 
•  Regional economic surveillance; 
•  Regional Asia bond market: 
o  The 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) on regional swaps. 
o  ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). 
o  The 2003 Asian Bond Market Initiatives (ABMI). 
o  The Asian Bond Fund Initiatives (ABF1 and ABF2 created in 2003 and 
2004 respectively). 
o  The 2005 FTSE/ASEAN Index Series to help standardise market indices. 
•  Of late, the proposals for Asian Monetary Fund, Asian Currency Index appear to 
surface in different forms. 
 
These bold reforms aim to speed-up the regional development of the East Asia 
market integration.  The recent 12
th ASEAN Summit in the Philippines on 13 January 
2007 agreed that the target date for creating the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) be 
brought forward by five years to 2015.  The AEC is the realization of a single market and 




4.    Roadblocks in Deepening the East Asia Capital Markets  
 
Despite these significant efforts at the official level, most observers would agree 
that East Asia is still behind Europe in terms of financial market integration.  In particular 
the capital markets are relatively shallow and contain significant barriers due to a host of 
reasons, many of which are entrenched: 
 
•  Large national differences in market practices, institutional development and 
regulatory standards, laws and processes. 
•  High transactions costs in many markets, as brokerage and stamp duties still 
hinder liquidity. 
•  Barriers to foreign entry and regulatory conservatism towards financial 
innovation. 
•  Conflict between national interests (protectionism) vs. integration (openness). 
•  Bureaucratic in-fighting and lack of cooperation between public and private 
interests.   8
•  The lack of a common philosophy and roadmap to integration.  While closer 
cooperation is a clarion call at the level of politicians, these efforts bog down 
when it comes to specifics. 
 
The reality is that several capital markets in Asia at the domestic level are still 
some distance away from fulfilling four key functions: efficient resource allocation, good 
price discovery, sound risk management and effective corporate governance.  Some of 
this is due to the legacy of exchange controls and previously entrenched policy-based 
lending, which meant that bank oversight still carry some window guidance.  All these 
leads to considerable differences in stages of development of the equity markets, meaning 
that smaller markets fear that any opening up would mean loss of their own market 
liquidity to foreign players.  At the equity market level, there is considerable 
segmentation, as institutional investor market is still under-developed and many markets 
are still dominated by large state-owned utilities/blue-chips.  If these lag in terms of 
delivery of profits and growth, then the whole market does not offer the attractiveness 
relative to other markets that do deliver growth and total return.    
 
On the other hand, although corporate governance and securities regulation has 
been tightened in the last few years, there are still many small stocks that are “penny 
stocks”, which are not pulling their weight in terms of value delivery and corporate 
governance.  If retail and foreign investors feel that their domestic markets are not 
protecting their property rights fairly, efficiently and transparently, then it is not 
surprising that they avoid the domestic market and diversifies into funds abroad (in 
developed markets).   Foreign fund managers shun smaller markets because they lack the 
depth of liquidity and larger investments could cause huge swings in prices that would be 
blamed inevitably on them when the market falls. 
 
  There is no doubt that most policy makers hope that the domestic capital market 
will benefit from more competition and opening up, that would improve the 
intermediation better.   In particular, there is awareness that the large amount of domestic 
savings is not being channeled to help rural and SME funding, as well as long-term social 
infrastructure.    9
 
Table 4: Financial Structure in Selected Countries, 1990 and 2005 (% of GDP) 
  Bank deposits  Equity Market  Bond Market  Insurance Premiums 
  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005 
ASEAN 
Brunei  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Cambodia  4.0
3  14.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Indonesia  29.8  36.2  4.4  27.1  0.4  19.0  0.9  1.5 
Lao PDR  4.0  17.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Malaysia  52.1  93.5  100.7  143.6  69.8  90.4  3.0  3.7 
Myanmar  7.9  8.9
5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Philippines  24.1  45.8  20.6  35.3  22.1  38.8  2.0  1.5 
Singapore  74.3  102.3  95.8  163.4  27.8  58.0  3.0  8.8 
Thailand  56.8  78.7  29.2  68.0  9.7  41.1  1.7  3.6 
Vietnam  10.9
4  38.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.5
3  1.6 
ASIA – Others 
China  75.6  177.8  2.4
1  32.0  8.5  25.6  0.8  2.7 
Hong Kong SAR  205.6  242.3  107.2  528.1  1.5  26.9  3.0
1  9.9 
India  31.4  52.2  10.4  60.1  19.9  33.8  1.5  3.2 
Japan  100.0  123.2  121.7  93.8  85.9  192.5  8.5  10.6 
Korea, Rep. of  32.6  68.8  48.2  72.9  34.1  78.1  11.0  10.5 
Taiwan  56.8  79.7  107.6  134.8  17.0  55.9  n.a.  14.2 
LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina  5.5  21.3  2.7  28.2  9.8  15.4  2.4  2.7 
Brazil  15.3
1  23.9  6.7  50.8  2.2
1  56.5  1.4  3.0 
Chile  28.2  31.6  38.3  110.5  29.0  37.1  2.7  3.9 
Mexico  14.1  23.0  10.6  21.9  21.1  24.2  1.1  1.8 
OTHERS 
Russian Federation  12.9
2  24.6  0.1
1  43.1  0.4
2  2.7  n.a.  2.8 
South Africa  48.3  60.0  120.8  170.5  100.2  43.2  9.6  14.4 
SELECTED OECD ECONOMIES 
Australia  49.0  72.1  40.6  113.5  35.6  50.9  7.3  7.4 
Canada  43.5  64.8  46.9  119.7  72.3  70.0  5.4  7.1 
Germany  53.8
1  98.1  21.7  463.6  51.6  75.1  5.7  7.1 
Switzerland  102.5  137.2  70.6  242.4  57.8  64.6  7.8  11.2 
United Kingdom  87.8  122.1  85.2  134.7  36.8  46.9  9.6  13.7 
United States  59.6  57.9  57.5  134.6  122.0  158.0  8.3  9.2 
Sources: CEIC data; World Bank, Financial Structure Dataset, February 2006 
1. 1992 data;  2. 1994 data;   3. 1995 data;   4. 1996 data;   5. 2003 data. 
n.a. denotes not available 
 
 
4.1    Regional Equity Integration Lagging behind Regional Trade Integration 
 
This section examines why East Asian markets remain small relative to the global 
markets.  First, of the total global market capitalization of US$42 trillion in 2005 (see 
Table 5 and Figure 6), East Asia accounted for 16% (US$ 6.7 trillion), and the market cap 
for ASEAN was barely 2%.  The global equity market remains heavily dollar-based 
(55%), mainly to the depth and size of the US markets (New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ).   Although there are some signs that the tight legislation, such as Sarbanes-
Oxley, may have been cumbersome, which has resulted in some regulatory arbitrage, by 
and large, many leading emerging markets are still quoted in American Depository   10
Receipts, with liquidity in such ADRs being stronger in New York, than in the home 
markets.  
 
Table 5    World Market Capitalization 
 
Market Capitalization  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
World (total) - US$ mn  31982402  27640836  23270879  31740572  38627320  41748202 
East Asia  4885450.5  3819637.8  3622130.4  5277400.6  6186957.1  6716334.3 
Japan - ¥ mn  3157090.2  2251795.5  2126041.1  3040756.8  3678355.5  3672045.5 
South Korea - Won mn  171586.8  220046  249638.6  329616  428648.8  718180.1 
China - RMB mn  580885.65  523766.09  462909.98  680960.18  639517.25  781174.53 
Hong Kong, China - 
HK$ mn  623491.43  505991.8  463020.48  714299.17  861241.73  947109.97 
Indonesia - Rp mn  26834.194  23005.538  29991.378  54659.092  73250.64  81428.12 
Malaysia - RM mn  116934.8  120007.4  123872.4  168376.2  190010.5  180214.11 
Philippines - Ps mn  25958.542  21223.763  18550.315  23566.516  28947.758  40150.207 
Singapore - S$ mn  153178.78  117450.75  101933.59  146102.74  171578.2  172492.64 
Thailand - Bt mn  29490.095  36351.014  46172.571  119063.87  115406.76  123539.11 
ASEAN - US$ mn  352041.94  317923.08  320485.26  511570.96  579163.67  597509.64 
NAFTA - US$ mn  16070629  14681629  11776552  15282754  17673188  18058619 
USA – US$ mn  15104040  13854620  11098100  14266270  16323730  16506452 
United Kingdom - £ mn  2580626.2  2179319.2  1856535.7  2470035.3  2796370.1  2840555.6 
Euro Zone - US$ mn  5426029.1  4315712.3  3504952.8  4957763.2  6815147.5  7318832 
EU – US$ mn  8506625.5  6866154.8  5701269.7  7926073.5  10330917  10941530 
Mercosur - US$ mn  465386.94  448111.7  290007.84  377490.32  516488.69  711288.72 
Source: World Bank.  Copyright and database right Euromonitor International 2007 
 
 
The lack of depth in the equity market is also regarded as one of the culprits of the 
crisis in 1997/1998.  Since the crisis, the East Asia equity markets show more integration 
with the US market, than with each other (see Table 6).  It is thus very clear fund 
managers would prefer to place their money in the US equity markets, and with that 
comes much of financial outflows from East Asia heading for the US market.  In the pre-
crisis period the equity market was very weak and were negatively correlated with some 
the of the bellwether indices like the NASDAQ and the NYSE of the US (average 
correlation of 0.021), and the Euronext Brussel of European market (average correlation 
of 0.066).  In the post-crisis period, the market indices for the East Asia countries were 
highly and strongly correlated with the US (average correlation of 0.602) and the 
European (average correlation of 0.441) market. 
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Source: World Bank. Copyright and database right Euromonitor International 2007 
 
 
4.2    East Asian Debt Markets Still Relatively Shallow and Lack Integration 
 
The reforms by ASEAN+3 have worked, but it is still not possible to say that Asia 
has deep and liquid bond markets, despite the fact that the scale of regional bond market 
expanded more than 4.5 times (annual amount) in 2005 (see Figure 7).   Most of the 
growth in the bond markets has been in the Korean and Chinese markets.  In terms of its 
ratio to GDP, East Asian bond markets have increased from 16.5% to 48.0% over the last 
eight years.   The reason why these markets are not that integrated is that the major 
pension and long-term funds in the Region are not yet significant buyers of each other’s 
bonds.  This is partly due to conservative investment policies, but also an ignorance of 
each other’s markets.  
 
In currency terms, the US dollar and the Euro still dominate the international bond 
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Table 6  Stock Market Indices Integration: Pre-and Post Crisis Period  
 
Pre-Crisis (1990-1997) 
  JP  ROK  CH  HK  TW  ID  MY  PH  SG   TH  US  UK  EU 
JP  1                         
ROK  0.430  1.000                       
CH      1.000                     
HK        1.000                   
TW  -0.432  -0.129      1.000                 
ID  -0.065  0.366      0.531  1.000               
MY  -0.103  0.535      0.373  0.870  1.000             
PH  -0.259  0.459      0.588  0.832  0.952  1.000           
SG  -0.159  0.562      0.428  0.751  0.935  0.958  1.000         
TH  0.132  0.868      -0.022  0.489  0.745  0.676  0.817  1.000       
US  -0.714  -0.546      0.741  0.297  0.157  0.366  0.212 
-
0.343  1.000     
UK  -0.748  -0.347      0.788  0.471  0.380  0.576  0.443 
-
0.089  0.964  1.000   
EU  -0.702  -0.511      0.834  0.368  0.189  0.401  0.248 
-
0.296  0.978  0.962  1 
                           
Post-Crisis Period (1998-2005) 
  JP  ROK  CH  HK  TW  ID  MY  PH  SG   TH  US  UK  EU 
JP  1                         
ROK  0.724  1.000                       
CH  -0.453  0.212  1.000                     
HK  0.854  0.639  -0.240  1.000                   
TW  0.748  0.592  -0.372  0.528  1.000                 
ID  0.547  0.886  0.264  0.635  0.405  1.000               
MY  0.557  0.835  0.314  0.761  0.445  0.931  1.000             
PH  0.801  0.601  -0.543  0.595  0.820  0.580  0.469  1.000           
SG  0.925  0.742  -0.269  0.956  0.737  0.657  0.765  0.714  1.000         
TH  0.274  0.713  0.409  0.398  0.352  0.842  0.811  0.391  0.457  1.000       
US  0.755  0.647  -0.201  0.840  0.490  0.737  0.724  0.745  0.788  0.495  1.000     
UK  0.856  0.304  -0.724  0.711  0.639  0.145  0.189  0.712  0.731  -0.132  0.666  1.000   
EU  0.713  0.563  -0.408  0.499  0.546  0.539  0.364  0.855  0.538  0.196  0.793  0.693  1.000 
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Figure 7   
 
 
Source:  Sakakibara (2006) based on data from Asia Bond Monitor, March 2006 
 
 
5.  Key Challenges Beyond ASIAN Bond Markets Initiatives (ABMI) 
 
We now come to why it is so difficult to push ahead with capital market 
integration, which is clearly part of the whole game plan for greater regional integration. 
There are many hindrances that could be observed and hindrances that are non-
observable.  It is too easy to say that political will alone will solve these barriers to 
integration.  Indeed, there are those who question whether there is a need to integrate 
regionally, since one has a choice to integrate globally.  
 
Just as the single most important problem in financial markets is information 
asymmetry, the single most important obstacle to market integration is the huge 
differences in Initial Conditions within East Asia.  Firstly, there are at least five 
economies with OECD level incomes per capita and level of sophistication (Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan), whilst there are still relatively poor   14
and underdeveloped economies such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
(CLMV). 
Secondly, Japan is still the largest economy in Asia by a significant factor.  
Despite the fast growth of China, Japan’s GDP is roughly equal to the rest of East Asia 
put together and its financial assets are roughly double the rest of Asia put together.  
Hence, Japan will play a crucial role in whatever shape Asian integration takes, but the 
historical legacies of conflicts with the rest of the Region play an important obstacle to 
common understanding.  No integration effort in Asia can succeed without some kind of 
detente in understanding between Japan and its neighbours, similar to that between 
Germany and the rest of Europe. 
 
Thirdly, even as there is now recognition that the Yen would have difficulty 
displacing the dominant roles of the US Dollar and the Euro in global financing, no 
integration can proceed smoothly also without resolving whether there should be an 
Asian Currency Unit and how this could evolve and under what monetary or central 
banking arrangements? 
  
We work towards a constructive step forward by re-thinking Asian integration in 
terms of its key principles of integration, its architecture and the “process” by which 
integration occurs.   
 
In sum, we have to go back to basic principles for integration: - 
 
•  Why should we integrate? 
•  For Whom should we integrate? 
•  How should we begin the “process” of integration?  
 
Following on recent work, we now use Network Theory and Nobel Laureate 
Douglass North’s Institutional Framework to think about the process of integration.  If we 
agree with North, then the process of economic change is all about common mindsets. 
 
Following North
4, we understand that the “process” of economic change involves 
institutional and organizational evolution, and this has an architecture, that is: - 
 
•  All economies and markets are path dependent, based on initial conditions 
shaped by geography, demography, history and culture. 
•  Different institutions and organizations evolve differently in response to 
changes in environment (competition/warfare, globalization, global warming 
etc) and to social beliefs about how to respond to these changes. 
•  “Organizations ... are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose 
to achieve objectives.”  North (200) 
•  “Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the 
costs of exchange and production.  The major role of institutions in a society 
is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) 
structure to human interaction”.  North (2005). 
                                                 
4 See particularly North (2000) and North (2005)   15
•  Markets are networks and network behaviour conforms to certain power 
laws
5. 
•  Whether each member joins an institutional or organization depends on its 
perception of its importance in the ultimate Network or Institutional 
Architecture and the benefits/risks or costs to the member. 
 
5.1    Markets are Networks 
 
  There is increasing recognition that markets are actually networks, across which 
participants trade property rights, such as equity, currency and the like.  If this is true, 
then networks conform to Metcalf’s Law, which states that the "value" or "power" of a 
network increases in proportion to the square of the number of nodes on the network.  
This phenomenon explains why economies or corporations try to expand as fast as 
possible, in order to maximize the value of their network and gain economies of scale.   
Growth can be achieved through acquisition or mergers, so that integration is only part of 
growth strategy.   
 
Physicists, such as Barabasi, were first to point out that nodes do not link at 
random – there is a “preferential attachment coefficient”.  In other words, there are 
reasons why nodes link with other nodes to form hubs, because of the efficiency of 
certain hubs.   Faster connection through a hub means that transaction costs are reduced 
to the benefit of all users.    
 
Because networks grow through linkages, the architecture of network has what 
Barabasi call a “scale-free, self-organizing behaviour”.  It is path driven; because the way 
a network evolves through alliances, acquisitions or failure reflect its history and 
experience.    
 
Networks also exhibit “winner-take-all” power laws where highly linked hubs 
dominate in number of links, whereas small nodes have few links.  
 
Network Theory is superior to the neo-classical economic theory in understanding 
institutional change because self-organizing behaviour involves both maximizing 
behaviour as well as survival behaviour.  Nodes (or market participants) in the face of 
huge information asymmetry do not just maximize utility; they have difficulty evolving 
strategies simply to survive.  Hence, coalition behaviour is also survival behaviour in the 
face of a common threat.  Integration reduces risks through sharing or distribution of risks 
throughout the network. 
 
Finally, the scale-free growth or decline of networks through expansion, coalition 
or collapse is a more dynamic depiction of competition and cooperation behaviour in 
markets.  Markets are fundamentally shaped by the competition between hubs for links 
with nodes, reflecting Metcalf’s Law.   Every hub tries to be the dominant hub, whilst 
other hubs may ally in order to prevent that happening.  They compete through what we 
have called elsewhere “Network Altruism”, which is not true altruism.  This is discussed 
in the next section.  
 
                                                 
5 See Barabasi (2003) and Castell (1999).   16
To sum up, neo-classic theory is a special case of a perfect network, across which 
there are no transaction costs, with perfect information and nodes link at random.  Once 
these conditions are relaxed with information asymmetry, high transaction costs and 
preferential attachment, markets behave as we currently observe them, with all their 
imperfections, idiosyncrasies and rise and falls.   
 
As Douglass North conceptualizes in historical terms, markets are network 
institutions that are path dependent, driven by ever changing and interactive behaviour 
between market participants acting as hubs or nodes. This switching of allegiance to 
different networks clearly mean that markets as networks are dynamic and always in 
transition or motion. 
 
 
5.2  Preferential Linkage vs. Network Altruism 
 
We now use Network Theory to explain the motivations for integration or 
disintegration.   As Barabasi pointed out, nodes do not join hubs at random – they do so 
because the hub provides superior benefits relative to costs (relative to other hubs).   The 
fundamental truism of markets is huge information asymmetry, not only in terms of 
FLOW costs of search, but also the STOCK of knowledge, which covers individual 
experience and institutional experience, the latter being the collective wisdom gained 
through history and bitter experience of wars, disasters and crises.  From the demand 
side, nodes do not link at random, because they search to link with the hub, which offers 
the best benefits with the lowest risks.   
 
On the other side of transactional exchange, the supply side of Hubs implies that 
they must be able to provide “Network Altruism” due to the Cluster Effect.  They offer 
benefits to the user nodes through economies of scale, superior technology, 
standardization and lower transaction costs.  The more a Hub can offer superior benefits 
in order to induce “preferential attachment”, the more links and the more value 
generation through Metcalf’s Law.  This phenomenon has become commonly understood 
because websites such as Hotmail, Yahoo and Google each compete intensely through 
giving superior or free service in order to attract users.   
 
Once users link with a particular hub, there are obvious costs in switching, and 
users will only shift once the benefits of shifting clearly outweighs the costs of remaining 
with a particular Hub. Nodes enjoy such “Altruism”, but fear that the dominant hub may 
exploits its monopolistic powers and tax them, so that they hedge also links with other 
hubs with less obvious benefits.  In other words, node-hub linkage suffers from the same 
Principal-Agent trust dilemma in corporate governance.  How does the node know that 
the hub will not betray its trust? 
 
Consequently, every network must have its “rules of the game” in which the 
players all obey rules that create social good and prevent free rider or social losses.  
Although the Hub can provide that enforcement benefit cheaply, there must be a rule to 
check and “regulate the regulator”.   
 
To sum up this overview of Network Theory, we conclude that before integration 
can begin, there must be a process to find out what benefits, costs, and areas of   17
commonality can be shared, including products, platforms, rules, who to enforce and 
what checks and benefits are there for everyone. 
 
5.3  Network Architecture 
   
There are fundamentally three types of network architecture: the centralized star 
network, where there is a single dominant hub, the distributed network where there are 
several large competing hubs, and an Internet structure, which is truly flat and self-
organizing.  Figures 8–10 provide three distinct forms of network architecture: (a) 
Centralized (Star) Network, with a dominant player (e.g. Microsoft); (b) Decentralised 
Network with several larger hubs and allows more choices ( e.g. airports as regional 
hubs); (c) Distributed Network with no key hub (e.g. World Wide Web or the Internet). 
 
Barabasi and others have shown there are trade-offs between different structures 
in terms of efficiency versus robustness.  An Internet structure is widely distributed and 
can be much more resilient than a Star structure, where breakdowns in the key hub could 
cause network failure as a whole.    
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5.2    Applying Network Theory to Capital Markets 
 
We are now in a position to apply Network Theory to the capital market.  We start 
with a microstructure of a network, that is a hub that behaves as the transmitter, and it is 
linked with a source node (that supplies), and a sink node (that receives).  Synonymously, 
capital markets are hubs to facilitate links and flows of capital with the aim of providing 





We now incorporate the ideas of “Institutional Change” as propounded by North: 
- 
 
•  According to North, institutional and organizational development is path 
dependent, with each organization or institution seeking to develop according to 
its own interests (adaptive efficiency or survival). 
•  Networks link together to share common beliefs, benefits or reduce risks and 
overcome common threats.  
•  Hence, network architecture matters – whilst star network is efficient, smaller 
nodes fear that the dominant hub will extract monopolistic powers and tax them. 
•  Consequently, the process of integration depends on a reiterative game of each 
member (node) evaluating whether to join a particular group (ASEAN, 
ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 etc), versus joining other groups (APEC, NAFTA, EU 
etc). 
•  In the end, it is about identifying common interests and recognizing self-interest 
(what are the benefit/risks of integration into a larger network?). 
 
Figure 11  Capital Markets act as Hubs to Facilitate Links and Flows at 
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•  This implies that larger hubs will have to engage in Network Altruism (providing 
benefits to smaller nodes in order to attract them into their network. 
 
Integrating the Network Theory and with North’s Institutional Change 
framework, we can derive five key issues which are discussed in detail below, in what we 
call the Five Degrees of Separation: - 
 
(1) Common Vision vs. “Winner-Take-All”. 
(2) Common Standards and Common Rules – whose rules?  
(3) “Principal-Agent” Dilemma – how to align incentives? 
(4) Lower Transaction Costs – how to lower barriers to network transactions with 
each other? 
(5) Common Processes – how to achieve institutional convergence? 
 
(1).    Common Vision vs. “Winner-Take-All” 
 
  The first degree of separation is about the benefits and risks of the “Winner-
Take-All” effect.  This effect has contradictory forces.  Whilst it is clearly beneficial to 
the winning hub, the fear of “Winner-Take-All” works against integration, because 
smaller nodes fear market dominance.   This suggests that having a single person or one 
country’s vision of what Asian market integration is a sure sign that that vision will not 
be realized.  
 
  We need a Shared Vision.  That Vision, which could take the form of common 
standards, principles, products or platform, must be owned or strongly accepted by the 
majority of potential members.  Since we do not know what that Vision is like, we must 
begin the Process of consultation, cooperation and learning to work together and to trust 
each other (Sheng, EABER Op-Ed 2006). 
 
Since there exists huge disparity in stages of development between the largest and 
the smallest of the East Asian economies or capital markets, a common vision must be 
developed in order to reconcile these disparities.  
 
We conclude that in order for Network Integration to work, the larger members 
have to demonstrate Altruism by contributing to alleviate disparities with the smaller and 
poorer members.  The best example of Network Altruism is the fact that Germany 
funding more than its fair share of the 1% of the Annual EU budget which is distributed 
for various EC agriculture and other subsidies.  The smaller EU members have benefited 
considerably from this generosity and access to the larger EU market.  
 
Although Network Altruism can take the form of bilateral or multilateral aid or 
grants, we believe that contributions should aim at increasing public goods for the Region 
as a whole, e.g. education, basic health, communications, environmental protection, etc.  
These would include building common social infrastructures to alleviate regional poverty. 
 
Moreover, we believe that a possible way to think about a Shared Vision is to 
avoid thinking exclusively about zero-sum game “Red Ocean” strategies in competing in 
traditional businesses, but to work toward win-win “Blue Ocean” green-field businesses,   22
such as derivative markets, where there could be common ownership without disturbing 
current vested interests. 
 
 
(2).   “Common Standards” 
 
The second degree of separation is about Common Standards.  Markets need 
common standards for greater efficiency. For example: The creation of single market for 
the European Union has made Europe the fastest growing mergers and acquisitions.  In 
2006, five of the world’s top ten mergers and acquisitions took place in Europe and the 
value of the European deals exceeded those in America for the first time (The Economist, 
January 27 2007). 
 
Competition between markets is also about competition in standards, e.g. HDVD 
vs. Blu-ray standards.  For example, one of the vulnerabilities in Asia is that we have one 
global supply chain with two standards, dollar and yen (Figure 12).  There are clearly too 
many national currencies, national rules and regulations, with different market standards 
that create market segmentation, illiquidity and high transaction costs.   We completely 
understand that in order to converge towards common standards, some degree of loss of 
national sovereignty will have to occur, resulting in national regulators and policy-makers 
becoming less protective of their domestic markets from competition.  Clearly, a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for Common Standards is a Shared Vision, 
entailing a massive change in mindsets of policy-makers. 
 
Moving towards Common Standards involves two possible paths – Harmonization 
as practiced in the EU Common Market, or Mutual Recognition, which recognizes the 
current national disparities, but each country works steadfastly towards Converge towards 
some Common Standards.  Indeed, since there already exists global standards of 
regulation, monetary and corporate governance, that is, the Financial Stability Forum’s 
Core Standards, there is strictly speaking no need to re-invent the wheel.   
 
Indeed, not only would it be extremely expensive for Asia to evolve its own 
separate set of standards, Asians would need to work together to achieve closer 
convergence with global standards in order to have sufficient clout or influence to change 
or modify global standards.   The clear advantage of working towards global standards is 
that there is choice of using either regional or global integration.  Each country is offered 
a choice of standards.  Some may move faster towards global standards, whereas others 
may opt for a lower regional standard.   




  The evolution of Common Standards also carries a domestic dimension (Figure 
13).  For example, the development of a Common Standard in the financial sector would 
require the coordination of the all regulations and laws by the jurisdictions: the ministry 
of finance, the central bank and the securities regulators.  It is the failure to coordinate 
interests that often stands in the way of common standards. 
Figure 12  The Asian Financial Network 
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(3)  Principal-Agent Dilemma – Alignment of Incentives 
 
The third degree of separation is the principal-agent dilemma of deciding which 
should be the dominant Asian Time-Zone Financial Hub?   This is ultimately a question 
that only competition and cooperation would decide, but any currently agreed 
institutional framework would create perceptions by members that this would give 
advantages through which one of the regional financial markets would advance as the 
winning hub.    
 
The best recent example is current the Asian “Noodle Bowl” of Bilateral Free 
Trade Agreements.  Even though everyone agrees that a multilateral FTA agreement 
would be the ideal solution, in practice, there are now at last count 150+ bilateral 
agreements.  Although this looks chaotic, this is in fact scale free networking in practice.  
Only when there are huge amounts of bilateral links would common hubs and standards 
emerge.   
 
Hence, what we need to learn from this experience in building trust in Principal-
Agent problems of delegating national authority to any regional organization (e.g. 
regional equity or derivative exchange) is to align incentives for common outcomes.  In 
other words, the regional institution or organization (hub) must demonstrate that it would 
behave fairly to all members and induce cooperative behaviour, through different options, 
such as: - 
 
Figure 13  “Common Standards” – the Domestic Dimension 
•  To ensure Common Standards in financial sector, there requires the coordination 
of the all regulations and laws by the three governing bodies: (1) Ministry of 
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– Having common ownership of the Hub 
– Allowing development of several Hubs, with each specializing in different 
products and services 
– Winner Hub distributing greater public goods and showing more Network 
Altruism 
– A commonly agreed mechanism to ensure that Principal-Agent can resolve 
disputes when benefits and interests are not aligned (e.g. common 
surveillance?) 
 
(4)  Lowering Transactions or Friction Costs 
 
The fourth degree of separation is about lowering transactions or friction costs in 
regional trading.  Markets that have become dominant in global trading do so because 
they offer the lowest transactions/friction costs for exchanges and transactions and also 
the best property right protections,  i.e. market participants are free to transact with 
relatively few legal or regulatory obstacles or barriers.  Many of the barriers or friction 
costs to higher liquidity are due to regulatory or protective barriers that create market 
segmentation and therefore lower efficiency.   
 
There is a need to identify a sequencing of convergence of transactions costs so 
that Asian network effects are maximized.  Each market has to identify the key barriers 
and friction costs and work with others to reduce these costs, taking into consideration the 
network benefits.  In a sense, competition between markets will eventually ensure that 
each will work towards these objectives.  For example, the demutualization of stock 
exchanges has made them more commercial and profit oriented, and therefore there is 
greater motivation towards lowering friction costs and seeking benefits of exchange 
alliances.   
 
The reason for this is due to the high cost of technology in trading, clearing and 
payment infrastructure.  Once built, there are huge economies of scale of sharing 
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(5)  Common Processes 
 
Finally, the fifth degree of separation is about Common Processes.  Market 
networks are about building market institutions that would involve political, and social-
cultural change.  It is also about change management.  In Douglass North terminology, 
we need to change the common “beliefs” so that Asians can share common values, so that 
Asian institutions, organizations can emerge to shape the future Asian capital market.  
This is a process that must take into consideration political perceptions and realities. 
 
One of the methods to create the passage of change is by using threat of external 
competition in order to raise domestic adaptive efficiency and robustness.  This would 
require extensive change of management.  This “Change Management” requires massive 
coordination of many jurisdictions - of balancing vested interests, building coalitions, 
changing laws, standards, and ultimately market and bureaucratic behaviour.  Thus, each 
economy has responsibility to: 
 
•  Using international rules and standards to raise and enforce domestic market 
standards, codes, and rules of the game; and  
•  Put in place the property rights infrastructure of a market economy that is 
fair, transparent, robust, flexible, and efficient.  
•  In other words, the first step of process reform begins at home!   
 
The above five degrees of separation is a framework for disparate economies to think 
about how to work together eventually to form an integrated market network.  In reality, 
this is a journey that will take time, since each country must re-engineer huge changes at 
the micro-macro, institutional, political, social, economic and social levels, before the 
final “architectured” network can be formed.  Several markets already have considerable 
Figure 14  Common Platforms Encourage Interconnectivity and Interoperability 
•  Common technology is now readily available, as well as G-30 Basle/IOSCO 
standards for real-time platforms (common trading and clearing and 
settlement/payment systems) that can work together in real time and generate 
huge common liquidity and high transparency.   
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join of alliances with other groups, such as APEC, or it can be a process that can move in 
parallel.  There can be many forms of alliances with EU and NAFTA at different levels, 
without Asian economies making up their mind which path to take.   
 
To repeat, the first step towards any form of integration is to get everyone to share 
common objectives, common principles, products and platforms.  Naturally, this requires 
a process of discovery.  The European Community took more than 50 years, with a 
common vision articulated by statesmen, such as Monet, before a decision to have 
political union through a common market and a common market.  To be frank, none of us 
knows what the final architecture and form of Asian integration, particularly capital 
market integration will be like.   Unless Asian economies break down barriers to each 
other, it is likely that multinational investment banks and securities houses will become 
the network catalysts.   
 
The other path is a policy-driven initiative, in which the policy makers, the 
regulators and the private sector work together in process of search, finding 
commonalities through working and testing each other, sometimes through bilateral 
alliances, sometimes multi-laterally.   Eventually, the path will become clearer.  To sum 
up, THE PROCESS IS THE PASSAGE, just as Marshall McLuhan used to say that the 
medium is the message.  
 
 
6.    Concluding Thoughts 
 
In sum up, using Network Theory and the Douglass North Institutional 
Economics framework has clarified for us the key issues related to market integration.  
This is a path dependent process that will involve sharing key beliefs and realizing 
adaptive efficiency with network robustness.  In other words, Asian capital market 
integration will only work if there are shared benefits and lower risks as an outcome, not 
when there is a “Winner-Take-All” inequality.   
 
There is an unexpressed feeling that if East Asia wants to achieve global parity 
with Europe and NAFTA in economic and political status, the region must move to 
global standards, processes and practices using global rules of the game.  The Region   
must develop superior standards and protection of property rights to even compete with 
the other standards.  We have to be realistic that information and initial condition 
asymmetry (political and cultural differences) within Asia is so huge that there is no 
currently common mindset, nor shared vision for serious regional capital market 
integration.   
 
Some may be disappointed that this paper has not set forth bold visions, because 
the authors believe that at this stage of the game, no broad vision is possible beyond 
rhetoric.  But there can easily be a shared process of discovery.  If there are those of like 
mind that share in some vision of integrated Asian market, in whatever form it takes, such 
as this forum and the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER), then at the 
national level, there should be more foray to discover the issues and degrees of separation 
raised by this paper.  Those who hope to gain most from greater regional integration, 
particularly the richer and more advanced economies with stronger institutional capacity 
need to play a much larger role in helping develop the Asian capital market network as   28
part of Asian regional development.  Smaller markets do not have the resources to make 
the change without the implicit or explicit help of the bigger markets.  The market by 
itself will not generate the network altruism to make a big difference, although regulatory 
arbitrage will continue to erode regulatory barriers to network integration.  Therefore, 
governments or perhaps civil society working with bureaucracies may have to make that 
change.  Changing institutional structures itself requires vision, mission, resources and 
determination.  This is about leadership. 
 
Who in Asia has the vision, mission and will to make that change is a subject 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
Kuala Lumpur and Beijing, 
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